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Abstract—We consider decentralized restless multi-armed ban-
dit problems with unknown dynamics and multiple players. The
reward state of each arm transits according to an unknown
Markovian rule when it is played and evolves according to an
arbitrary unknown random process when it is passive. Players
activating the same arm at the same time collide and suffer
from reward loss. The objective is to maximize the long-term
reward by designing a decentralized arm selection policy to
address unknown reward models and collisions among players.
A decentralized policy is constructed that achieves a regret
with logarithmic order when an arbitrary nontrivial bound
on certain system parameters is known. When no knowledge
about the system is available, we extend the policy to achieve a
regret arbitrarily close to the logarithmic order. The result finds
applications in communication networks, financial investment,
and industrial engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Classic MAB with A Single Player
In the classic MAB, there are N independent arms and a
single player. Each arm, when played, offers an i.i.d. random
reward to the player. The reward distribution of each arm
is unknown. At each time, the player chooses one arm to
play, aiming to maximize the total expected reward in the
long run. This problem involves the well-known tradeoff
between exploitation and exploration. For exploitation, the
player should select the arm with the largest sample mean
of reward. For exploration, the player should select an under-
played arm to learn its reward statistics.
Under the non-Bayesian formulation, the performance mea-
sure of an arm selection policy is the so-called regret or
the cost of learning defined as the reward loss with respect
to the case with known reward models [1]. In 1985 Lai
and Robbins showed that the minimum regret grows at a
logarithmic order under certain regularity conditions [1]. The
best leading constant was also obtained, and an optimal policy
was constructed to achieve the minimum regret growth rate
(both the logarithmic order and the best leading constant).
In 1987, Anantharam et al. extended Lai and Robbins’s
results to accommodate multiple simultaneous plays [2] and
a Markovian reward model where the reward of each arm
evolves as an unknown Markov process over successive plays
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and remains frozen when the arm is passive (the so-called
rested Markovian reward model) [3].
Several other simpler policies have been developed to
achieve logarithmic regret for the classic MAB under an i.i.d.
reward model [4], [5]. In particular, the index policy—referred
to as Upper Confidence Bound 1 (UCB-1)—proposed in [5]
achieves the logarithmic regret with a uniform bound on the
leading constant over time. In [6], UCB-1 was extended to the
rested Markovian reward model adopted in [3].
B. Decentralized MAB with Distributed Multiple Players
In [7], Liu and Zhao formulated and studied a decentralized
version of the classic MAB with M (M < N ) distributed
players under the i.i.d. reward model. Different arms can have
different reward distributions and they are unknown to the
players. At each time, a player chooses one arm to play based
on its local observation and decision history without exchang-
ing information with other players. Collisions occur when
multiple players choose the same arm, and, depending on the
collision model, either no one receives reward or the colliding
players share the reward in an arbitrary way. The objective
is to maximize the long-term sum reward from all players.
Another desired feature of policies for decentralized MAB is
fairness, i.e., different players have the same expected reward
growth rate. Liu and Zhao proposed the Time Division Fair
Sharing (TDFS) framework, it achieves the same logarithmic
regret order as the centralized case where all players share their
observations in learning and collisions are eliminated through
centralized perfect scheduling [7]. Assuming a Bernoulli re-
ward model, decentralized MAB was also addressed in [8],
where the single-player policy UCB-1 was extended to the
multi-player setting.
C. Main Results
In this paper, we consider the decentralized MAB with a
restless Markovian reward model. In a single-player restless
MAB, the reward state of each arm transits according to an
unknown Markovian rule when played and transits according
to an arbitrary unknown random process when passive as
addressed in our prior work [9]. In [9], we proposed a policy
Restless UCB (RUCB), which achieves a logarithmic order of
the weak regret defined as the reward loss compared to the
case when the player knows which arm is the most rewarding
and always plays the best arm. RUCB borrows the index form
of UCB-1 given in [5] and has a deterministic epoch structure
with carefully chosen epoch lengths to balance exploration and
exploitation. The concept of weak regret was first used in [10];
it measures the reward loss with respect to the optimal single-
arm policy, which, while optimal under the i.i.d. and rested
Markovian reward models (up to an O(1) term of loss for the
latter), is no longer optimal in general under a known restless
reward model. Analysis of the strict regret of restless MAB is
in general intractable given that finding the optimal policy of
a restless bandit under known model is itself PSPACE-hard in
general [11].
In this paper, we extend RUCB proposed in our prior
work [9] to a decentralized setting of restless MAB with
multiple players. We consider two types of restless reward
models: exogenous restless model and endogenous restless
model. In the former, the system itself is rested: the state of an
arm does not change when the arm is not engaged. However,
from each individual player’s perspective, arms are restless
due to actions of other players that are unobservable and
uncontrollable. Under the endogenous restless model, the state
of an arm evolves according to an arbitrary unknown random
process even when the arm is not played. Under both restless
models, we extend RUCB to achieve a logarithmic order of the
regret. The result for the exogenous restless model, however,
is stronger in the sense that the regret is indeed defined with
respect to the optimal policy under known reward models. This
is possible due to the inherent rested nature of the systems.
There are a couple of parallel work to [9] on the single-
player restless MAB. In [12], Tekin and Liu adopted the weak
regret and proposed a policy that achieves logarithmic (weak)
regret when certain knowledge about the system parameters is
available [12]. The policy proposed in [12] also uses the index
form of UCB-1 given in [5], but the structure is different from
RUCB proposed in [9]. Specifically, under the policy proposed
in [12], an arm is played consecutively for a random number
of times determined by the regenerative cycle of a particular
state, and observations obtained outside the regenerative cycle
are not used in learning. RUCB, however, has a deterministic
epoch structure, and all observations are used in learning.
In [13], the strict regret was considered for a special class
of restless MAB. Specifically, when arms are governed by
stochastically identical two-state Markov chains, a policy was
constructed in [13] to achieve a regret with an order arbitrarily
close to logarithmic.
Notation For two positive integers k and l, define k ⊘
l
∆
=((k − 1) mod l) + 1, which is an integer taking values
from 1, 2, · · · , l.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In the decentralized MAB problem, we have M players
and N independent arms. At each time, each player chooses
one arm to play. Each arm, when played (activated), offers
certain amount of reward that models the current state of the
arm. Let sj(t) and Sj denote the state of arm j at time t and
the state space of arm j respectively. Different arms can have
different state spaces. When arm j is played, its state changes
according to a Markovian rule with Pj as the transition
matrix. The transition matrixes are assumed to be irreducible,
aperiodic, and reversible. As for the state transition of passive
arms, we consider two models: endogenous restless model and
exogenous restless model. In the endogenous restless model,
arm states change in arbitrary ways when not played. In the
exogenous restless model, arm states remain frozen if not
engaged. The players do not know the transition matrices of
the arms and do not communicate with each other. Conflicts
occur when different players select the same arm to play.
Under different conflict models, either the players in conflict
share the reward or no one obtains any reward. The objective
is to maximize the expected total reward collected in the long
run. Let ~πj = {πjs}s∈Sj denote the stationary distribution of
arm j (under Pj ), where πis is the stationary probability (under
Pj) that arm j is in state s. The stationary mean reward µj
is given by µj =
∑
s∈Sj sπ
j
s . Let σ be a permutation of
{1, · · · , N} such that
µσ(1) ≥ µσ(2) ≥ µσ(3) ≥ · · · ≥ µσ(N).
A policy Φ is a rule that specifies an arm to play based on the
local observation history. Let tj(n) denote the time index of
the nth play on arm j, and Tj(t) the total number of plays on
arm j by time t. Notice that both tj(n) and Tj(t) are random
variables with distributions determined by the policy Φ. Under
the conflict model where players in conflict share the reward,
the total reward by time t is given by
R(t) =
N∑
j=1
Tj(t)∑
n=1
sj(tj(n)). (1)
Under the conflict model where no players in conflict obtain
any reward, the total reward by time t is given by
R(t) =
N∑
j=1
Tj(t)∑
n=1
sj(tj(n))Ij(tj(n)). (2)
where Ij(tj(n)) = 1 if arm j is played by one and only one
player at time tj(n), and Ij(tj(n)) = 0 otherwise.
As mentioned in Sec. I, for both restless models, per-
formance of any policy Φ is evaluated using regret rΦ(t)
defined as the reward loss with respect to having M best
arms constantly engaged. Specifically, for both restless models,
regret is defined as follows:
rΦ(t) = t
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) − EΦR(t) +O(1), (3)
where the constant O(1) is caused by the transient effects of
playing the M best arms, EΦ denotes the expectation with
respect to the random process induced by policy Φ. The
objective is to minimize the growth rate of the regret. Note
that the constant O(1) term can be ignored when studying the
growth rate of the regret.
PSfrag replacements
Slot
Exploitation epochsExploration epochs
Slot
Slot
Epoch
arm armarmarm
arm
armarm
armarmarmarmarmarm
The general structure of decentralized RUCB
1
1
1
111
2
2
2
2
3 4 5 6 7 8
2n−1 2× 4n−1
2× 4n−1 2(M − 1) × 4n−1 2M × 4
n−1
a∗2 a
∗
M−1a
∗
M a
∗
M
(N − 1) × 4n−1 + 1 N × 4n−1
NN
Structure of the nth exploration epoch for player 1
Structure of the nth exploitation epoch for player 1
Compute the indexes and identify the arms with the M highest indexes
a∗1a
∗
1
First
Second
Third
Two types of epochs are not always interleaving.
exploration
exploitation
epoch
Policy structure
· · ·· · ·· · ·
· · ·· · ·· · ·· · ·
· · ·
Fig. 1. Epoch structures of decentralized RUCB
III. THE DECENTRALIZED RUCB POLICY
The proposed decentralized RUCB is based on an epoch
structure. We divide the time into disjoint epochs. There
are two types of epochs: exploitation epochs and exploration
epochs (see an illustration in Fig. 1). In the exploitation
epochs, the players calculate the indexes of all arms and play
the arms with the M highest indexes, which are believed to
be the M best arms. In the exploration epochs, the players
obtain information of all arms by playing them equally many
times. The purpose of the exploration epochs is to make
decisions in the exploitation epochs sufficiently accurate. As
shown in Fig. 1, in the nth exploration epoch, each player
plays every arm 4n−1 times. At the beginning of the nth
exploitation epoch the player calculates index for every arm
(see (5) in Fig. 2) and selects the arm with the M highest
indexes (denoted as arm a∗(1) to arm a∗(M)). Each exploitation
epoch is divided into M subepochs with each having a length
of 2 × 4n−1. Player k plays arm a∗((m−k+M+1)⊘M) in the
mth subepoch of each exploitation epoch. The details on
interleaving the two types of epochs are given in Step 2
in Fig. 2. Specifically, whenever sufficiently many (D ln t,
see (4)) observations have been obtained from every arm in
the exploration epochs, the player is ready to proceed with a
new exploitation epoch. Otherwise, another exploration epoch
is required to gain more information about each arm. It is also
implied in (4) that only logarithmically many plays are spent
in the exploration epochs, which is one of the key reasons
for the logarithmic regret of decentralized RUCB. This also
implies that the exploration epochs are much less frequent
than the exploitation epochs. Though the exploration epochs
can be understood as the “information gathering” phase, and
the exploitation epochs as the “information utilization” phase,
observations obtained in the exploitation epochs are also used
in learning the arm dynamics. This can be seen in Step 3 in
Fig. 2. The epoch structure, (i.e., the starting and ending points
of epochs) are prefixed numbers only depending on parameter
D. This is one of the key reasons why different players can be
coordinated (i.e., entering the same epoch at the same time)
without intercommunications.
Decentralized RUCB
Time is divided into epochs. There are two types of epochs,
exploration epochs and exploitation epochs. At the beginning of
the nth exploitation epoch, we choose the M arms to play, each of
them for 2 × 4n−1 many times. In the nth exploration epoch, we
play every arm 4n−1 many times. Let nO(t) denote the number
of exploration epochs played by time t and nI(t) the number of
exploitation epochs played by time t.
1. At t = 1, we start the first exploration epoch, in which every
arm is played once. We set nO(N+1) = 1, nI(N+1) = 0.
Then go to Step 2.
2. Let X1(t) = (4nO(t)−1)/3 be the time spent on each arm in
exploration epochs by time t. Choose D according to (6)(7).
If
X1(t) > D ln t, (4)
go to Step 3 (start an exploitation epoch). Otherwise, go to
Step 4 (start an exploration epoch).
3. Calculate indexes di,t for all arms using the formula below:
di,t = s¯i(t) +
√
L ln t
Ti(t)
, (5)
where t is the current time, s¯i(t) is the sample mean from
arm i by time t, L is chosen according to (6), and Ti(t) is
the number of times we have played arm i by time t. Then
choose the arms with the M highest indexes (arm a∗(1) to arm
a∗(M)). Each exploitation epoch is divided into M subepochs
with each having a length of 2 × 4n−1. Player k plays arm
a∗((m−k+M+1)⊘M) in the mth subepoch of each exploitation
epoch. After arm a∗(1) to arm a∗(M) are played, increase nI
by one and go to step 2.
4. Each Play each arm for 4(nO−1) slots. Each exploration
epoch is divided into N subepochs with each having a length
of 4(nO−1). Player k plays arm a∗(m−k+N+1⊘N) in the mth
subepoch of each exploitation epoch. After all the arms are
played, increase nI by one and go to step 2.
Fig. 2. Decentralized RUCB policy
A. Eliminate Pre-Agreement
So far we have assumed a pre-agreement among the players:
they target at the M best arms with different offsets to avoid
excessive collisions. In this subsection, we show that this pre-
agreement can be eliminated while maintaining the logarithmic
order of the system regret. Furthermore, players can join the
system at different times without any global synchronization.
Specifically, at each player, the structure of the exploration
and exploitation epochs is the same as the local RUCB policy
with pre-agreement. The only difference here is that in each
exploitation epoch, the player randomly chooses one of the
M arms considered as the best to play whenever a collision
with other players is observed. If no collision is observed, the
player keeps playing the same arm. This simple elimination
of pre-agreement leads to a complete decentralization among
players while achieving the same logarithmic order of the
system regret. Except that each player can join the system
according to the local schedule, the player can also leave the
system for an arbitrary finite time period.
IV. THE LOGARITHMIC REGRET OF DECENTRALIZED
RUCB
In this section, we show that the regret achieved by the
decentralized RUCB policy has a logarithmic order. This is
given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Under the exogenous restless Markovian re-
ward model, assume that when arms are engaged, they can
be modeled as finite state, irreducible, aperiodic, and re-
versible Markov chains. All the states (rewards) are posi-
tive. Let πmin = mins∈Si,1≤i≤N πis, ǫmax = max1≤i≤N ǫi,
ǫmin = min1≤i≤N ǫi, smax = maxs∈Si,1≤i≤N s, smin =
mins∈Si,1≤i≤N s, and |S|max = max1≤i≤N |Si| where ǫi =
1− λi (λi is the second largest eigenvalue of the matrix Pi).
Assume that different arms have different µ values 1 Set the
policy parameters L and D to satisfy the following conditions:
L ≥ 1
ǫmin
(4
20s2max|S|2max
(3− 2√2) + 10s
2
max), (6)
D ≥ 4L
(minj≤M (µσ(j) − µσ(j+1)))2
. (7)
Under the conflict model where players share the reward,
the regret of decentralized RUCB at the end of any epoch can
be upper bounded by
rΦ(t) ≤ 1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1]
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
µσ(i)
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
N∑
j=M+1
(µσ(M) − µσ(j))
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
.
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
j=1
µσ(M)
|Sσ(M)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+
N∑
i=1
[(min
s∈Si
πs)
−1 ∑
s∈Si
s] (8)
1This assumption can be relaxed by utilizing the shared index set. This
assumption is only for simplicity of the presentation.
Under the model where no player in conflict gets any
reward, the regret of decentralized RUCB at the end of any
epoch can be upper bounded by:
rΦ(t) ≤ 3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i))
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(i)|
πmin
+
1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1](
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
+
N∑
i=1
[(min
s∈Si
πs)
−1 ∑
s∈Si
s] (9)
We point out that upper bounds of regret in Theorem 1
can be extended to any time t instead of only for ending
points of epochs. They can also be extended to the endogenous
restless model in terms of weak regret. The no pre-agreement
version of decentralized RUCB can also achieve regret with a
logarithmic order.
Proof: See Appendix A for details.
Theorem 1 requires an arbitrary (nontrivial) bound on s2max,
|S|max, ǫmin, and minj≤M (µσ(j)−µσ(j+1)). In the case where
these bounds are unavailable, D and L can be chosen to
increase with time to achieve a regret order arbitrarily close
to logarithmic order. This is formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: Assume the exogenous restless model and that
all arms, when engaged, are modeled as finite state, irre-
ducible, aperiodic, and reversible Markov chains. For any
increasing sequence f(t) (f(t)→∞ as t→∞), if L(t) and
D(t) are chosen such that L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞ , f(t)
D(t) → ∞
as t→∞, and D(t)
L(t) →∞ as t→∞, then we have
rΦ(t) ∼ o(f(t) log(t)). (10)
We point out that the conclusion in Theorem 2 still holds for
the endogenous restless model, though the proof needs to be
modified.
Proof: See Appendix B for details.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the decentralized restless multi-
armed bandit problems, where distributed players aim to
accrue the maximum long-term reward without knowing the
system reward statistics. Under the exogenous model where
the arm reward status remains static when not engaged, we
proposed a policy to achieve the optimal logarithmic order
of the system regret. Under the endogenous model where the
arm reward status evolves according to an arbitrary random
process when not engaged, we showed that the proposed policy
achieves a logarithmic (weak) regret. Furthermore, we showed
that the proposed policy achieves a complete decentralization
where no pre-agreement or global synchronization among
players is required.
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first rewrite the definition of regret as
rΦ(t) = t
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) − EΦR(t)
=
N∑
i=1
[µiE[Ti(t)]− E[
Ti(t)∑
n=1
si(ti(n))]]
+E[
Ti(t)∑
n=1
si(ti(n))]]− EΦR(t)
+t
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
N∑
i=1
µiE[Ti(t)]. (11)
To bound the first term in (11), Lemma 1 is introduced
below:
Lemma 1 [3]: Let Y1, Y2, · · · be Markovian with state space
S, matrix of transition probabilities P , an initial distribution ~q,
and stationary distribution ~π (πs is the stationary probability of
state s). Let Ft be the σ-algebra generated by Y1, Y2, · · · , Yt
and G an σ-algebra independent of Y∞ = ∨Yt. Let T be a
stopping time of {Ft ∨G}. The state (reward) at time t is de-
noted by s(t). Let µ denote the mean reward. For any stopping
time T , there exists a value AP ≤ (mins∈S πs)−1
∑
s∈S s
such that E[
∑T
t=1 s(t)− µT ] ≤ AP .
Using Lemma 1 the first term in (11) can be bounded by
the following constant:
N∑
i=1
[(min
s∈Si
πs)
−1 ∑
s∈Si
s] (12)
To show that the regret has a logarithmic order, it is
sufficient to show that the second term plus the third term
in (11) has a logarithmic order. These two terms can be
understood as regret caused by two reasons. The first one is
engaging bad arms in the exploration epochs. The second one
is not playing the expected arms in the exploitation epochs.
To show the second term in (11) has a logarithmic order, it
is sufficient to show that the regret caused by the two reasons
above have logarithmic orders.
Let E[TO(t)] denote the time spent on each arm in the
exploration epochs by time t and an upper bound on TO(t)]
is:
TO(t) ≤ 1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1]. (13)
Consequently the regret caused by engaging bad arms in
the exploration epochs by time t is upper bounded by
1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1]
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
. (14)
The second reason for regret in the second term of (11) is
not playing the expected arms in the exploitation epochs. Let
tn denote the beginning point to the nth exploitation epoch.
Let Pr[i, j, n] denote the possibility that arm i has a higher
index than arm j at tn, where µi < µj and µj ≥ µσ(M). It
can be shown that:
Pr[i, j, n] ≤ |Si|+ |Sj |
πmin
(1 +
ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)t−1n (15)
Since different subepochs in the exploitation epochs are
symmetric, the regret in different subepochs are the same. In
the first subepoch, player k aims at arm σ(k). In the model
where players in conflict share the reward, player k failing to
identify arm σ(k) in the first subepoch of the nth exploitation
epoch can lead to a regret no more than µσ(k)2 × 4n−1. In
calculating the upper bound for regret, for player M , we can
assume that playing the arm σ(M + 1) to arm σ(N) can
contribute to the total reward. Thus an upper bound for regret
in the nth exploitation epoch can be obtained as
2M4n−1(1 +
ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)t−1n [
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
µi
|Si|+ |Sj |
πmin
+
M−1∑
j=1
µM
|SM |+ |Sj |
πmin
+
N∑
j=M+1
(µM − µj) |Si|+ |Sj |
πmin
] (16)
By time t, at most (t − N) time slots have been spent on
the exploitation epochs. Thus
nI(t) ≤ ⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉. (17)
From the upper bound on the number of the exploitation
epochs given in (17), and also the fact that tn ≥ 234n−1,
we have the following upper bound on regret caused in the
exploitation epochs by time t (Denoted by rΦ,I(t)):
rΦ,I(t) ≤ 3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
µσ(i)
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
N∑
j=M+1
(µσ(M) − µσ(j))
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
j=1
µσ(M)
|Sσ(M)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
(18)
Combining (11) (12) (14) (18), we can get the upper bound
of regret:
rΦ(t) ≤ 1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1]
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
µσ(i)
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
N∑
j=M+1
(µσ(M) − µσ(j))
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
M−1∑
j=1
µσ(M)
|Sσ(M)|+ |Sσ(j)|
πmin
+
N∑
i=1
[(min
s∈Si
πs)
−1 ∑
s∈Si
s] (19)
Next we consider the model where no player in conflict gets
reward. In the first subepoch of the nth exploitation epcoh,
each mistake by player k can cause regret more than µσ(k)2×
4n−1. Assuming each mistake can cause
∑M
i=1 µσ(i)2× 4n−1
regret leads to the following upper bound for regret under this
conflict model:
rΦ(t) ≤ 3⌈log4(
3
2
(t−N) + 1)⌉(1 + ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i))
M∑
i=1
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
|Sσ(i)|+ |Sσ(i)|
πmin
+
1
3
[4(3D ln t+ 1)− 1](
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
+
N∑
i=1
[(min
s∈Si
πs)
−1 ∑
s∈Si
s] (20)
APPENDIX B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The choice of L(t) and D(t) implies that D(t) → ∞ as
t → ∞. The regret has three parts: the transient effect of
arms, the regret caused by playing bad arms in the exploration
epochs, and the regret caused by mistakes in the exploitation
epochs. It will be shown that each part part of the regret is
on a lower order than f(t) log(t). The transient effect of arms
is the same as in Theorem 1. Thus it is upper bounded by a
constant independent of time t and is on a lower order than
f(t) log(t).
The regret caused by playing bad arms in the exploration
epochs is bounded by
1
3
[4(3D(t) ln t+ 1)− 1]
(
M∑
i=1
µσ(i) −
M
N
N∑
i=1
µσ(i)
)
. (21)
Since f(t)
D(t) →∞ as t→∞, the part of regret in (21) is on a
lower order than f(t) log(t).
For the regret caused by playing bad arms in the exploitation
epochs, it is shown below that the time spent on a bad arm i
can be bounded by a constant independent of t.
Since D(t)
L(t) → ∞ as t → ∞, there exists a time
t1 such that ∀t ≥ t1, D(t) ≥ 4L(t)(minj≤M (µσ(j)−µσ(j+1)))2 .
There also exists a time t2 such that ∀t ≥ t2, L(t) ≥
1
ǫmin
(7
20s2max|S|2max
(3−2√2) + 10s
2
max). The time spent on playing
bad arms before t3 = max(t1, t2) is at most t3, and
the caused regret is at most (
∑M
j=1 µσ(j))t3. The regret
caused by mistakes after t3 is upper bounded by 6(1 +
ǫmax
√
L
10smin
)(
∑M
i=1 µσ(i))
∑M
i=1
∑N
j=1,j 6=i
|Sσ(i)|+|Sσ(i)|
πmin
. Thus the
regret caused by mistakes in the exploitation epochs is on a
lower order than f(t) log(t).
Because each part of the regret is on a lower order than
f(t) log(t), the total regret is also on a lower order than
f(t) log(t).
REFERENCES
[1] T. Lai and H. Robbins, “Asymptotically Efficient Adaptive Allocation
Rules,” Advances in Applied Mathematics, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 4C22, 1985.
[2] V. Anantharam, P. Varaiya, J. Walrand, “Asymptotically Efficient Alloca-
tion Rules for the Multiarmed Bandit Problem with Multiple Plays-Part
I: I.I.D. Rewards,” IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-32
,No.11 , pp. 968-976, Nov., 1987.
[3] V. Anantharam, P. Varaiya, J. Walrand, “Asymptotically Efficient Alloca-
tion Rules for the Multiarmed Bandit Problem with Multiple Plays-Part II:
Markovian Rewards,” IEEE Transaction on Automatic Control, Vol. AC-
32 ,No.11 ,pp. 977-982, Nov., 1987.
[4] R. Agrawal, “Sample Mean Based Index Policies With O(log n) Regret
for the Multi-armed Bandit Problem,” Advances in Applied Probability,
Vol. 27, pp. 1054C1078, 1995.
[5] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, P. Fischer, “Finite-time Analysis of the Multi-
armed Bandit Problem,” Machine Learning, 47, 235-256, 2002.
[6] C. Tekin, M. Liu, “Online Algorithms for the Multi-Armed Bandit
Problem With Markovian Rewards,” Proc. of Allerton Conference on
Communications, Control, and Computing, Sep., 2010.
[7] K. Liu, Q. Zhao, “Distributed Learning in Multi-Armed Bandit with
Multiple Players,” IEEE Transations on Signal Processing, Vol. 58,
No. 11, pp. 5667-5681, Nov. 2010.
[8] A. Anandkumar, N. Michael, A.K. Tang, A. Swami “Distributed Algo-
rithms for Learning and Cognitive Medium Access with Logarithmic
Regret,” Submitted to IEEE JSAC on Advances in Cognitive Radio
Networking and Communications.
[9] H. Liu, K. Liu, Q. Zhao, “Logarithmic Weak Regret of Non-Bayesian
Restless Multi-Armed Bandit,” Proc. of Internanional Conference on
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), May, 2011.
[10] P. Auer, N. Cesa-Bianchi, Y. Freund, R.E. Schapire “The nonstochastic
multiarmed bandit problem,” SIAM Journal on Computing, Vol. 32, pp.
48C77, 2002.
[11] C. Papadimitriou, J. Tsitsiklis, “The Complexity of Optimal Queuing
Network Control,” Mathematics of Operations Research, Vol. 24, No. 2,
pp. 293-305, May 1999.
[12] C. Tekin, M. Liu, “Online Learning in Opportunistic
Spectrum Access: A Restless Bandit Approach,” Arxiv pre-print
http://arxiv.org/abs/1010.0056, Oct. 2010.
[13] W. Dai, Y. Gai, B. Krishnamachari, Q. Zhao “The Non-Bayesian
Restless Multi-armed Bandit: A Case Of Near-Logarithmic Regret,” Proc.
of Internanional Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), May, 2011.
[14] D. Gillman, “A Chernoff Bound for Random Walks on Expander
Graphs,” Proc. 34th IEEE Symp. on Foundatioins of Computer Science
(FOCS93),vol. SIAM J. Comp.,Vol. 27, No. 4, 1998.
